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Reprisal and diplomacy: conﬂict resolution within the context of
Anglo–Dutch commercial relations c1300–c1415
Jurriaan Wink and Louis Sicking*
(Received 15 November 2016; accepted 16 February 2017)
This article discusses how merchants or skippers suffering losses aimed to get
redress for damages in trading and shipping from or with Holland and Zeeland
in the fourteenth and early ﬁfteenth century within the context of Anglo–
Dutch trade and diplomacy. In accordance with legal doctrine both the
English king and the Count of Holland considered reprisal as an ultimate
remedy. Both rulers used the possibility of reprisal as a means of pressure
within Anglo–Dutch diplomacy. Their willingness to support their subjects
went beyond the issue of damage redress as it also enabled them to have
more control over their subjects. When reprisal was eventually issued,
rulers on both sides of the Channel carefully supervised and controlled its
procedures. Even though rulers were prepared to support victims via
diplomacy and, ultimately, reprisal, they did consider individual interests in
the functioning of the wider political and economic interests of their countries.
Keywords: reprisal; diplomacy; conﬂict resolution; damage redress; maritime
trade; Anglo–Dutch relations 1300–1415; fourteenth century
I. Introduction
Trade and shipping were thriving industries in Northwestern Europe in the late
Middle Ages. But those seeking success through such enterprises, particularly
those involving partners from different cultural backgrounds, were faced with a
number of challenges. Differences in the customs, languages and, above all, jur-
isdictional afﬁliations of foreign businesses created potential for misunderstanding
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and conﬂict. Proﬁt through maritime trade and shipping in pre-modern times also
demanded awareness of the potential and use of violence. ‘Robbery under arms
was a normal aspect of trade.’1
When a ship was attacked and taken at sea, the owner and its cargo could seek
redress by carrying out a counterattack to regain his loss. Such retaliatory measures
could easily lead to escalation, especially when the burgeoning conﬂict harmed inno-
cent bystanders from the original wrongdoer’s society. Just as partners in business
shared an interest in the safe conduct of their activities, sovereigns and towns also
recognised the importance of regular trade and shipping for the growth and
welfare of their countries and towns. Public authorities thus became involved in
the resolution of conﬂicts that occurred as a consequence of international trade and
shipping. Those claiming damages could seek redress by appealing for the support
of their local or central authorities or by addressing the authorities of the wrongdoer.
One way to obtain redress for damages was reprisal. Reprisal is the recovery of
damages by private individuals, including outstanding debts, from one or several
members of the original aggressor’s community. Reprisal could be performed in
two ways: ﬁrst, by the seizure of goods belonging to members of the offender’s
or debtor’s community. Second, by granting the victim permission to employ his
own means – logically by ship in the case of mariners – to obtain goods or to
capture persons belonging to the aggressor’s or debtor’s community amounting to
the value of the damages suffered. In practice, the latter was not without violence
as neither skippers nor merchants were likely to surrender their ships and goods
voluntarily.2 Reprisal was thus based on the principle of collective liability. Due
to the risk of escalation through reprisals, which could incite counter reprisals, auth-
orities were extremely reluctant to grant reprisal letters. This, after all, could allow
disputes between individuals to grow into broader conﬂicts between communities,
thus diminishing the welfare of international trade on a broader scale. Letters of rep-
risal were therefore granted as a last resort when redress through diplomatic and
judicial means was deemed impossible.3 Reprisal can be distinguished from
1NAM Rodger, ‘The Law and Language of Private Naval Warfare’ (2014) 100(1) The Mar-
iner’s Mirror 6.
2Thomas Heebøll-Holm, Ports, Piracy, and Maritime War: Piracy in the English Channel
and the Atlantic, c 1280–c 1330 (Brill, 2013) 154; Pièrre-Clement Timbal, ‘Les lettres de
marque dans le droit de la France medievale’ in Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin, X,
L’Etranger, vol II (Editions de la Librairie Encyclopédique, 1958) 109, 119–20.
3JHA Lokin and WJ Zwalve, Hoofdstukken uit de Europese codiﬁcatiegeschiedenis (3rd
edn, Boom 2006) 113–14; Karl-Heinz Böhringer, Das Recht der Prise gegen Neutrale in
der Praxis des Spätmittelalters (Hamburg, 1972) 44–48; Heebøll-Holm (n 2) 11, 134–
40, 146, 153–55; Stephen Neff, ‘Reprisals’ in Encyclopedia of War (Wiley, 2011); MH
Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965) 218–
24; René de Mas Latrie, ‘Du droit de marque ou droit de représaille au Moyen Âge’
(1866) 27(1) Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes 529; Marie-Claire Chavarot, ‘La prac-
tique des lettres de marque d’après les arrêts du parlement (XIIIe-début XVe siècle)’
(1991) 149(1) Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes 51; Timbal (n 2).
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retaliation in that in the case of the former a person was entitled by a public authority
to claim compensation for damage sustained from a wrongdoer. For princes, letters
of reprisal left no room for retaliation; it was purely a means of compensating one’s
private loss.4 Reprisal must also be distinguished from privateering, as the former
concerns private enforcement actions with some form of public endorsement in
peacetime or war while the latter relates exclusively to war. A privateer is only
allowed to seize ships and goods belonging to declared adversaries of his commis-
sioning authority.5
Grants of reprisal were formulated differently depending on the place, period
and language of the commissioner. Thomas Heebøll-Holm has already identiﬁed a
range of different terms applied in different contexts, including ‘la marke’, ‘lincen-
ciam marchandi’, ‘litteram marchandi’, and expressions for the right of reprisal,
such as ‘possit marchare’, ‘marcham’, ‘marches’, ‘gage’ and ‘marchati’.6 While
the term ‘letters of marque and reprisal’ was used in England from 1354
onwards, the terms continued to vary greatly in practice.7 The Dutch sources
examined for this article do not use a single term.8 In most sources, reprisal is
referred to as the right to seize goods of foreigners from a certain country as com-
pensation for a loss. For the sake of convenience, we shall use the expression
letters of reprisal to refer to all grants to conduct reprisals.9
Letters of reprisal allowed public authorities, primarily princes, to control
private actions at a time when those authorities lacked their own means of
control. Reprisal enabled princes to govern and limit the use of private violence.
Allowing for greater distinction between lawful and unlawful practices, it empow-
ered princes to protect the interests of their own subjects as well as foreign mer-
chants sanctioned to carry out reprisal. Even before reprisal could be executed
in practice, the threat of action could relieve tensions associated with diplomatic
4See Heebøll-Holm (n 2) 154.
5See Böhringer (n 3) 51; Louis Sicking, De piraat en de amiraal (Brill, 2014) 7; See also
Rodger (n 1); M Tranchant and S Hamel, ‘Le deploiement de l’Amirauté de France à La
Rochelle à la ﬁn du Moyen Âge’ (2014) 19(2) Revue d’histoire maritime 33, 43–44.
6See Heebøll-Holm (n 2) 155–58.
7JA Simpson and ESC Wiener, The Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 1989).
8HJ Smit (ed), Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den handel met Engeland, Schotland en
Ierland 1150–1585. Eerste deel, 1150–1485: eerste stuk, 1150–1435 (Martinus Nijhoff,
1928); Edward John Long Scott and Louis Gilliodts van Severen, Le Cotton Manuscrit
Galba BI (Brussels, 1896); Zeger Willem Sneller and WS Unger, Bronnen tot de geschie-
denis van den handel met Frankrijk (Martinus Nijhoff, 1930); Frans van Mieris, Groot
charterboek der graaven van Holland, van Zeeland, en heeren van Vriesland. Vierde deel
(Leiden, 1756); Georg Frederik thoe Schwartzenberg en Hohenlansberg, Groot Placaat-
en Charter-boek van Vriesland. Eerste deel (Leeuwarden, 1768).
9About the linguistic confusion about ‘letter of marque’ and ‘lettre de marque’ in English
and French, see Rodger (n 1) 6, 12. The German terminology on the contrary allows for
a clearer distinction, a ‘Markebrief’ being a letter of reprisal and a ‘Kaperbrief’ being a
commission to privateer, in spite of confusion in older German literature on the topic.
See Böhringer (n 3) 44–49.
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negotiations.10 Recognising the potential for taxation, princes generally sought to
facilitate commercial prosperity and thus avoided letters of reprisal.
The concept and practice of reprisal has already drawn the attention of scho-
lars. Both pre-modern jurists and modern legal historians have discussed the
concept in different contexts. Particularly inﬂuential was the work of Bartolus
of Sassoferrato. His Tractatus represaliarum (Treaty of Reprisals) from 1354
was not only contemporaneous to the period under consideration, but also
shaped the work of his contemporaries and later scholars, including John of
Legnano, Honoré Bonet and Nicholas Upton. Bartolus described the conditions
for reprisal in great detail, emphasising that reprisal is a desperate remedy, a last
resort that could only be granted by princes with no superior.11 In terms of
modern historiography, we will limit ourselves here to a few remarks on the litera-
ture on reprisal in England and France as this contribution will focus on the
Anglo–Dutch context. In the beginning of the twentieth century Reginald
Marsden examined English cases. He noted that despite the establishment of
admiralty courts, private conﬂicts between merchants were rarely settled in
these forums. Generally, cases were resolved via common law and the king’s judg-
ment.12 In 2010, Bryan Dick studied the process of reprisal looking at different
contexts but with a focus on England and France. He concluded that the legal
process surrounding the seizure of shipping vessels was civil rather than criminal
in nature. Moreover, the plaintiff’s demand for restitution, rather than the state’s
desire to monopolise violence at sea, was the driving force behind such
actions.13 Recently Thomas Heebøll-Holm has addressed reprisal in the context
of Anglo–French relations around 1300.14 Nicholas Rodger has also examined
the concept as it pertained to England, in close connection with privateering, in
the early modern era.15
10Emily Sohmer Tai, ‘Marking Water: Piracy and Property in the Pre-modern West’ (2003)
http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/ebook/p/2005/history_cooperative/www.historycooperative.
org/proceedings/seascapes/tai.html (accessed 27 September 2016); Heebøll-Holm (n 2)
140; Alfred Rubin, The Law of Piracy (Transnational, 1988) 34; Louis Sicking, Neptune
and the Netherlands: State, Economy, and War at Sea in the Renaissance (Brill, 2004)
420–21.
11E.g. Bartolus of Sassoferrato, ‘Tractatus Represaliarum’ in Consiliorum Bartoli libri duo
(Lyon, 1555); CN Sidney Woolf, Bartolus of Sassoferrato: His Position in the History of
Medieval Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, 1913) 203. See Keen (n 3)
219–20; D Gaurier, Histoire du droit international. De l’Antiquitité à la creation de
l’ONU (Presses universitaire de Rennes, 2014) 111–12; Jacob Giltja, ‘Roman Law and
the causa legitima for Reprisal in Bartolus’ (2014) 20(1) Fundamina: A Journal of Legal
History 349.
12Reginald Godfrey Marsden, ‘Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law in England’ (1909)
24(96) The English Historical Review 675, 677–82.
13Bryan Dick, ‘Framing “Piracy”: Restitution At Sea in the Later Middle Ages’ (PhD thesis,
University of Glasgow 2010) 4, http://theses.gla.ac.uk/2244/ (accessed 15 October 2016).
14See Heebøll-Holm (n 2).
15Rodger’ (n 1).
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Marie-Claire Chavarot uncovered a fairly sophisticated procedure for reprisal
in France around the fourteenth century. Victims would usually seek to resolve
conﬂicts locally before turning to the parliament of Paris, which could issue
letters of reprisal following a meticulous investigation of the case. The parliament
directed these letters towards speciﬁc communities rather than entire countries.
The execution of such letters in France remained a strictly private matter as parlia-
ment abstained from all forms of intervention.16
The following explores these themes in the context of Anglo–Dutch trade and
diplomacy, examining the means by which merchants or skippers sought redress
of damages from or with Holland and Zeeland in the fourteenth and early ﬁfteenth
century. The focus will be on the role of reprisal. Both Holland and Zeeland were
important players in shipping in Northwest Europe in the late Middle Ages, with
Zeeland preceding Holland as the archipelago proﬁted by the decline of Flemish
trade in the late-thirteenth century.17 Dutch –meaning ‘from Holland and Zeeland’
– and foreign merchants and skippers, trading with each other, became involved in
cases of damage redress that may have included reprisal. The following analysis
focuses primarily on records for the period 1250 to 1425, as published in
Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den handel met Engeland, Schotland en Ierland
1150–1585 and several other source compendia.18 In order to determine the practical
procedure of reprisal, we will ﬁrst examine the general possibilities, steps or phases
of such a procedure, with a primary focus on Anglo–Dutch cases. We will then
discuss the general strategies for controlling reprisal before looking more closely
at the tactics of a particular merchant, John Waghen from Beverley, in obtaining
redress in Holland. Our aim is to illustrate the variety of interests at play and the
ways in which these differing interests inﬂuenced the case’s resolution. This will
allow us to evaluate the signiﬁcance of reprisal within the context of Anglo–
Dutch trade and diplomacy in the fourteenth and early ﬁfteenth century.
16See Chavarot (n 3) 79–85.
17Nelly Johanna Martina Kerling, Commercial Relations of Holland and Zeeland with
England from the Late 13th Century to the Close of the Middle Ages (EJ Brill, 1954)
35–36, 193. For an overview of Anglo-Dutch commerce in the second half of the thirteenth
century see DEH de Boer, ‘Florerend vanuit de delta. De handelsbetrekkingen van Holland
en Zeeland in de tweede helft van de dertiende eeuw’ in DEH de Boer, EHP Cordfunke and
H Sarfatij (eds), Wi Florens…De Hollandse graaf Floris V in de samenleving van de der-
tiende eeuw (Matrijs, 1996) 126–52, 139–47.
18HJ Smit (ed), Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den handel met Engeland, Schotland en
Ierland 1150–1585. Eerste deel, 1150–1485: eerste stuk, 1150–1435 (Martinus Nijhoff
1928). Hereafter, we will refer to this work as the BhESI followed by the number (no) of
the entry in question. Aside from the Dutch sources mentioned in note 8, we also make
use of several English editions from the Calendar of the Close Rolls preserved in the
Public Record Ofﬁce. For the sake of convenience we shall refer to these publications as
CCR followed by the edition title, publisher, edition year and page number. Likewise,
the Calendar of the Patent Rolls preserved in the Public Record Ofﬁce will be referred to
as CPR followed by the edition title, publisher, edition year and page number.
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II. The procedure of reprisal in Anglo–Dutch practice
How could conﬂicts involving merchants or sailors from different regions or
countries be resolved? The frequency of cross-cultural interaction in ports, on
rivers and at sea provided many occasions for conﬂict. Disputes could concern
unfulﬁlled payment, robbery by opportunistic merchants on open waters, or
even damage incurred during a melee between intoxicated sailors. While the
initial conﬂict was undesirable, further unrest should be prevented as much as
possible. Due to the concept of collective responsibility, disputes between individ-
uals could spiral out of control as other individuals got involved. How, then, could
victims of maritime conﬂict ﬁnd compensation?
Theoretically, merchants could seek compensation by carrying out reprisals
on their own initiative. This was illegal, for legal action demanded the prince’s
authorisation in the form of a letter of reprisal. Based on the surviving
documents, it is tempting to conclude that merchants generally avoided
such actions. Then again, illegal reprisals would rarely, if ever, leave a written
record.
Victims could also seek the support of public agencies by ﬁling a complaint to
the local authorities (either the port magistrate or the prince, sometimes both in
this order) of the perpetrator(s).19 Although uncommon, the government of a
city could also complain to a foreign prince on behalf of its merchants.20
Ideally, the case was settled locally after this and lost property was restored or
compensated. It is difﬁcult to say how often cases were settled locally, as we
are, in fact, unable to identify examples of this in the sources studied. We conclude
that such incidents were exceptional in the fourteenth century, and ﬁnd support for
this theory in previous studies of Anglo–Castilian conﬂicts, where authorities
were only willing to offer redress to foreigners who enjoyed the backing of
their home rulers.21
If conﬂicts could not be settled locally, victims would address the case to their
prince, either through direct petition or with the help of a (local) representative.22
This is an interesting step in the process, as the prince was then compelled to pass
judgement. The following example demonstrates how conﬂicts could be resolved
19We have only encountered such complaints indirectly; in diplomacy between princes it is
often mentioned that the victim could not settle the case locally (for whatever reason). This
could be due to the selection of sources by the editor of the BhESI; the archives from some
larger English cities were visited but certainly not all. Further research of local sources
might give more insight into this aspect of the procedure of reprisal.
20E.g. BhESI, nos 89 and 787.
21See Heebøll-Holm (n 2) 209–12, 224–26; see also the contribution of Javier Añíbarro
Rodríguez in this issue on the Cuatro villas in northern Castile; Compare with Oscar Gel-
derblom, Cities of Commerce: The Institutional Foundations of International Trade in the
Low Countries, 1250–1650 (Princeton University Press, 2013) 15.
22It must be noted however that the victim could still always turn to illegal reprisal.
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without violence or diplomatic pressure. Sometime in May 1293, Hugo Mulard, a
merchant from Holland, was robbed by Walter Hobbe, an English merchant, and
his brothers from Bristol in the sea between England and Normandy. In addition to
his ship, the perpetrators seized goods valued at £52 sterling. On 14 June, 1294,
Mulard ﬁled a complaint to King Edward I of England (r 1272–1307). This appar-
ently resulted in a procedure at the Royal Court, for we know that Hobbe declared
his innocence, claiming to have purchased the ship from citizens of Bristol and
was not in possession of Mulard’s goods. The verdict was twice postponed, ﬁrst
to 25 June, and later to 2 August 1294, to allow both parties to assemble evidence
for their claims. The verdict passed by the Royal Court on 2 August instructed
Mulard to procure a certiﬁcate from the Dutch count, Floris V (r 1256–96), verify-
ing his claims concerning the worth of his ship and goods. At some point before 23
August 1295, Floris V sent Edward I a letter conﬁrming Mulard’s claim, adding
that he hoped for a swift resolution to the case. On that date, Mulard appears to
have given powers of attorney to one Christiaan, a Dutch knight, in negotiating
a compensation with Hobbe in his name. Christiaan’s brokerage proved successful
as he reported that he had received compensation from Hobbe the following day.23
Thus, the case was resolved without violence or long diplomatic negotiations.
Most cases were not resolved this easily, however. Before reprisal became an
option, rulers ﬁrst sought to settle conﬂicts between their subjects via diplomacy.
Typically, the prince of the victim sent a letter to the prince of the perpetrator in
which he complained on behalf of his subject. In order to increase the chance
of compensation or restitution, such letters were very detailed. In one example,
Count William VI (r 1404–17) of Holland-Zeeland dispatched such a letter to
King Henry IV of England (r 1399–1413) on 6 June, 1411. William’s subject,
Jan Yewinszone from Schiedam, was returning home with goods worth c £106
when, close to the mouth of the Maas river, he was robbed by a man named Pren-
degast and other subjects of the English king. They assaulted Jan with two ships
coming from Dover and Sandwich. The attack occurred around Saint Boniface day
(5 June), almost certainly in 1410. Having provided the details of the case, the
count asked the English king for the restitution of Jan’s goods, citing the peace
once enjoyed by subjects and the exceptional freedom with which Englishmen
were allowed to trade in his land. The count also mentioned another conﬂict
between Jan and other individuals from the year before.24 It appears that when
one complaint was made, other issues of Dutch merchants were mentioned at
the same time, probably for the sake of convenience.25 Ideally, the English king
would resolve the case after the count’s letter, having enough information to
23BhESI, no 105.
24BhESI, no 881; see Scott and van Severen (n 8) 305.
25Compare this with the contribution of Ian Peter Grohse in this same issue in which an
initial complaint from 1312 concerned attacks on Orkney, but also mentioned the seizure
of merchants in Bergen. Although Grohse thinks the attacks were related, it may be that
they were mentioned for the sake of convenience.
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ﬁnd and prosecute the offenders. The victim would have been compensated and
the case would have been resolved, all without disrupting trade or causing
further disturbance. For the case of Yewinszone, we are not informed on the
actual settlement of the conﬂict.
Reprisal could be necessary in order to compensate a subject for different
reasons. Some foreign princes proved unwilling or unable to respond to requests
by a victim’s prince. Reprisal was not preferable and only used as the ﬁnal
recourse for gaining redress for damages. Even if the initial request for compen-
sation proved futile, princes could and often would reiterate their request for com-
pensation without taking action. This becomes clear, for example, in a letter sent
by King Edward III of England (r 1327–77) to Count William IV of Holland-
Zeeland (r 1337–45) on 1 July 1343, in which Edward requested compensation
for robberies committed by the count’s subjects. When his ﬁrst request failed,
he appealed once more for compensation, adding that if his request was again
ignored, he would resort to ‘more stringent measures’ that, most likely, implied
the force of reprisal.26 This threat was thus employed to apply diplomatic pressure
to bring about resolution without actually issuing a letter of reprisal.
When diplomatic pressure proved futile, a prince could issue a warrant of
arrest for the perpetrators or their fellow countrymen when spotted, for example
in a port, in order to compensate a subject. In England, this seems to have been
the norm.27 For Holland-Zeeland we have only one, relatively late example
from 1415, in which the count ordered his bailiffs, steward, sheriffs, judges and
others servants to arrest English merchants in order to compensate the losses of
one of his subjects.28
Beyond issuing a warrant of arrest, princes could deliver letters of reprisal to
the individual(s) who had suffered a loss. On 6 March, 1403, Albert of Bavaria,
count of Holland and Zeeland (r 1358/1389–1404) issued such a letter in which
all of his subjects were informed that Wysse Willemszone, a citizen of Middel-
burg, could arrest or seize the goods of subjects of the duke of Brittany. Willems-
zone held this privilege in the count’s lands, waters or at sea, until revocation of the
letter.29 The count could thus hinder reprisal when circumstances demanded, for
example, when negotiations resulted in an agreement and letters of reprisal
were revoked in an effort to restore trade. The latter point is important as reprisal
did not preclude the diplomatic resolution of conﬂict, as will be evident in the case
of John Waghen.
Having described the basic procedure for reprisal, let us now examine the
potential for abuse. Several historians have argued that there were no mechanisms
to control abuse once letters of reprisal were issued. Timbal wrote that control of
26BhESI, no 430; CCR, Edward III AD 1343–1346 (Kraus Reprint, 1972) 219.
27See Dick (n 13) 111.
28BhESI, no 826.
29See Sneller and Unger (n 8) no 76.
60 J. Wink and L. Sicking
reprisal following a letter’s issuance was not always optimal.30 Likewise, Marsden
and Chavarot found no traces of systematic control on reprisal in English or
French cases respectively.31 However, we maintain that some degree of systematic
control could be employed. Although it was impossible to ensure full control of
reprisal given its execution by private individuals, systematic measures to
prevent abuse were taken. Such measures were necessary because reprisals
could instigate further unrest. Dick has argued that letters of reprisal did not
endorse indiscriminate plundering. In England, one ﬁnds measures of control,
including the inventory of goods in order to conﬁrm that the correct merchants
were robbed and the valuation of conﬁscated goods to ensure that compensation
was proportional.32 We advance that such efforts were also employed in order
to impede abuses in Holland-Zeeland.
Different measures prevented different forms of abuse. First, princes tried to
prevent their subjects from exploiting letters of reprisal by inhibiting someone
seizing more goods than allowed. In Holland-Zeeland, each time a letter of reprisal
was issued, those arrested were to remain unharmed while their goods were to
remain untouched and in the country. Those bestowed with a letter of reprisal, for
example the abovementioned Willemszone, had to present the items conﬁscated
before the count and his council. The latter, not Willemszone himself, would
repay his losses and all expenditures in conducting the reprisal.33 Thus, while rep-
risal itself was private, the count and his council controlled the ﬁnal stages of the
procedure. Additionally, a ruler could exclude certain merchants or towns from rep-
risals for various reasons, as will be demonstrated below. A ‘fair’ reprisal, that is one
that allowed for compensation in correspondence with the damage suffered, was
seen as important; injustice would only prolong and exacerbate the conﬂict. As
with reprisals executed by individuals, Dutch counts issued warrants of arrest
under the proviso that seized goods and detained individuals were to remain unal-
tered and unharmed until the count’s council made a decision.34
Another way of preventing abuse concerned the grievances that merchants
directed at their offenders. It was conceivably easy to issue fake complaints in an
attempt to obtain redress for non-existent losses. Naturally, princes did not always
believe complaints at face value and could order investigations into the veracity
of the victim’s claims. Princes may have been more inclined to trust complaints
issued by their own subjects than those ﬁled by foreigners. King Edward III, for
instance, commissioned Richard de Wylughby and ﬁve others to investigate a com-
plaint of the merchant Jan Zeelander of Dordrecht on 18 June, 1352. Zeelander
alleged that Reynald Kyng of Dersingham and others had seized his ship, valued
30See Timbal (n 2) 130–31.
31See Marsden (n 12) 682; Chavarot (n 3) 84–85.
32See Dick (n 13) 113–15.
33See Sneller and Unger (n 8) no 76.
34BhESI, no 826.
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at £40, as well as his goods. The complaint also alleges that Zeelanders’s crew had
been so badly abused that he could no longer rely on them as crewmen.35
The same caution was taken for complaints by foreign princes on behalf of their
merchants. In response to a complaint levelled against Dutch robbers by King
Edward I, Count William III of Holland-Zeeland (r 1304–37) explained on 1
November 1306, that he could not conﬁrm that the robbers in question were his sub-
jects, as he had expressly prohibited Dutch subjects from harming English traders.
Promising to investigate the complaints, the count also complained of English rob-
beries and requested that the king provide a date and location at which they could
negotiate the matter.36 In this case, the count was motivated to investigate the
matter in order to substantiate his image as a just ruler, capable of protecting his sub-
jects, especially as he drew attention to the misdeeds of Englishmen.
Princes could also support their subjects by requesting their foreign partners to
conduct investigations. King Edward II (r 1307–27) did just that on 6 October
1310, after receiving news of injuries inﬂicted upon his subjects by those under
the count’s authority. He petitioned the count to acknowledge the complaints of
his subjects and, when necessary, rectify injustices against them.37 Investigation
could also serve to make up for delayed reactions, such as when, on 16 May
1320, Count William III attempted to prevent retaliatory measures and facilitate
negotiations with the English king by pledging to carry out investigations of
wrongdoing.38
Finally, investigation could be a necessary means of obtaining details in a sub-
ject’s case. On 10 June 1344, for example, Edward III proclaimed that investi-
gations revealed that Nichalas Scot of Newcastle has been robbed of his ship
and cargo of hides and coal when on route to markets in Flanders. Having set
sail on 10 September 1341, Scot’s ship drifted to Brill, where on 5 May 1342, citi-
zens of Dordrecht, Brill and Middelburg seized the ship, valued at £40, and wares,
valued at £73. The king ordered the mayor and bailiffs of Newcastle, Lynn and
Boston to seize goods until they collected a value of respectively £40, £40 and
£33.39 Investigations thus enabled the king to accurately determine the amount
seized, thereby facilitating the fairer and more precise orchestration of reprisal.
As noted, reprisals and counter-reprisals posed threats to the normal ﬂow of
trade. Recognising the disadvantages posed to all parties, princes and merchants
alike would eventually seek resolution through negotiation and agreement, regard-
less of the preceding conﬂict’s duration and intensity. This is exempliﬁed in an
agreement between King Edward II and Count William III from 3 August,
35BhESI, no 474; CPR, Edward III Vol IX AD 1350–1354 (His Majesty’s Principal Sec-
retary of State for the Home Department, 1907) 332. In this case, the results of the inves-
tigation were unknown.
36BhESI, no 163.
37BhESI, no 199.
38BhESI, no 284.
39BhESI, no 437.
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1309. Following years of controversy, theft and assault between merchants,
Edward and William entered an agreement that promised compensation for all
those victimised in the preceding period of disturbance.40 While it is true that
this agreement ultimately failed due to factors beyond the scope of the present
study, we can see the rulers’ preparedness in negotiating and establishing agree-
ments that maintained or induced the restoration of trade. Regardless of the
scale of conﬂict, the overall importance of trade took precedence over localised
conﬂicts involving the interests of individual merchants. The following case
study offers an opportunity to examine how differing interests inﬂuenced the res-
olution of conﬂicts between merchants and skippers.
III. The case of John Waghen from Beverley
As we have seen, resolving maritime conﬂicts often involved extensive nego-
tiation between princes. Whereas those active in trade and shipping would ration-
ally have preferred a peaceful and quick resolution of conﬂict in most cases, rulers
were confronted with other, often greater interests than those of individual mer-
chants. How and how quick a case was settled depended on a number of
factors. Focusing on the case of John Waghen from Beverley, the following exam-
ines how differing interests inﬂuenced the way in which princes sought resolutions
of conﬂict and damage redress. While John Waghen has been subject to previous
investigation,41 our analysis should contribute new insights, especially in respect
to the diplomatic dimensions of reprisal.
John Waghen (?–1431/32) was a merchant from Beverley, Yorkshire. Despite
his modest family origins, Waghen ascended professional and political hierarchies
to gain membership to the Corpus Christi guild in 1409, the ofﬁce of chamberlain
of York in 1413 and the sheriffdom of the same town in 1416/17.42 His case
lasted from 1396 until 1415 and was the only known controversy of reprisal
between England and Holland-Zeeland from this period. It was only during this
period of conﬂict that Waghen received his ofﬁce of chamberlain.43 Waghen’s
case compares to other, earlier incidents, yet has been selected for analysis due
to the relative wealth of surviving records and their unusually rich illustrations
of Anglo–Dutch damage redress in the late-fourteenth and early-ﬁfteenth
centuries.
The conﬂict began sometime before 18 June 1396. On that date, Waghen com-
plained of an unfulﬁlled payment in a letter to the archbishop of York, then the
40BhESI, no 183.
41Most recently Dick (n 13) 130–36.
42Charles Newby Wawn,Wawn Family Records (Sunderland: Hill Press, 1926–1931) parts
2, 3 and 4; David Crouch, Piety, Fraternity and Power: Religious Medieval Guilds in Late
Medieval Yorkshire, 1389–1547 (York Medieval Press, 2000) 284.
43Jenny Kermode, Medieval Merchants: York, Beverley and Hull in the Later Middle Ages
(Cambridge University Press, 1998) 325.
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chancellor of England. The debtor, Pelgrim Florenszoon from Leiden in Holland,
refused to pay 850 nobles for a bond issued for the purchase of wool fromWaghen
at the wool staple in Calais. Not only was Waghen unsuccessful in petitioning
Leiden and Dutch count for redress, he also suffered further at the hands of a
man from Delft, Diederijc Jacobszoon, who took Waghen’s bond by force and
threatened him with death if he returned. Seeking a resolution, Waghen requested
that the English chancellor order the mayor and constables of Calais to seize the
goods of merchants from Leiden.44
As usual, action was not immediate. The English king ﬁrst addressed the count
of Holland-Zeeland. In a letter from 18 June 1396, King Richard II (r 1377–99)
explained Waghen’s case to Count Albert before requesting the count’s assistance
in ensuring justice for his subject.45 Richard’s letter was ineffective, however, and
on 17 January 1397, the king issued a public statement recounting Waghen’s failed
petitions to the count of Holland-Zeeland and his losses still outstanding, which
then totalled 852½ nobles 22d. Richard identiﬁed Florenszoon and Jacobszoon
as perpetrators and explained that his own request for compensation from Count
Albert had proven equally fruitless. Failing to resolve the conﬂict diplomatically,
Richard thus issued letters of reprisal against all ships from Zeeland and Holland
that were harboured, or would harbour in any English port. Dutch merchants,
sailors and their goods were to be seized in order to compensate Waghen.46 The
letters of reprisal were not issued speciﬁcally to Waghen. Later sources in this
case demonstrate that ofﬁcials of coastal towns as well as Waghen and his retainers
were permitted to carry out seizures by way of royal writ. Thus, both of the
methods for reprisal outlined in the introduction – collective liability seizure
and private repossessions – were sanctioned simultaneously.
Given the large scale of arrests, which concerned all Dutch vessels and sailors,
one can imagine the consequences they had for those who traded with and were
reliant on the imports of Dutch merchants. As important as Waghen’s demand
for compensation may have been, there were other, larger interests at stake.
This appears to be the case when, on 7 March 1397, Richard II issued a letter
to the mayor and sheriffs of London, in which he reiterated his warrant for the
arrest of all merchants and goods from Holland and Zeeland and acknowledged
that the town had rightfully arrested the ships of six Dutch merchants.
However, the king’s letters were not intended to authorise the seizure of ships
and merchants carrying foodstuff. As a result, the six merchants were allowed
to reclaim their cargo with eels and beer, sell it in London and depart whenever
they desired.47 Richard II wrote to the same mayor and sheriffs the very same
44BhESI, no 741.
45BhESI, no 742.
46BhESI, no 745; CPR, Richard II Vol IV AD 1388–1392 (Kraus Reprint, 1971) 91.
47BhESI, no 746; CCR, Richard II AD 1396–1399 (Kraus Reprint, 1972) 42.
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day, this time suspending all arrests issued in the case of Waghen until further
order.48
Later that year, on 5 October, Richard II ordered the bailiffs of Scarborough
and Whitby to release Dutch merchants arrested in line with Waghen’s case for
compensation. The king also clariﬁed his decision, noting that the seized ships,
among other things, contained salt, which was essential to the realm. Moreover,
around 120 Dutch ships had abstained from entering English ports out of fear
of arrest. Interestingly, the king did not suspend his order of arrest in Scarborough
and Whitby as he had done previously in London.49 It is evident that by this point,
the demand for foodstuffs outweighed Waghen’s campaign for compensation. It is
unclear when exactly Richard announced the exemption of foodstuffs from his
order; we have no ofﬁcial declaration speaking thereto, nor did he cite this
when ﬁrst issuing his letters of reprisal.
Trade with the Dutch continued in the years after 1397,50 but on 27 October
1399, the new King Henry IV issued another sweeping order for arrests at
Waghen’s request. The king demanded his admirals, ofﬁcials and other subjects
to detain all merchants, skippers and goods from Holland and Zeeland, adding
that his hand had been forced by the Dutch count’s failure to provide justice in
spite of Waghen’s and Richard II’s appeals.51
Not only was this renewal ineffective, the case experienced even greater stag-
nation. Waghen’s case is only mentioned again explicitly in 1412. There are,
however, two documents from 1400 and 1402 that suggest that arrests related to
the case were still being carried out. Both explain that arrested (Dutch) merchants
were to be released ‘despite earlier edicts’,52 which appears to be an allusion to the
royal orders cited above. After 1402, there are no more traces of Waghen’s case
until 1412. Various customs accounts suggest that trade between Holland-
Zeeland and England continued without signiﬁcant disruption during this period.
Dutch traders readily imported numerous other products that did not fall under
the category of foodstuff.53 Anglo–Dutch relations were quite amicable, in fact,
as the Dutch count granted various rights to the English wool staple in Middelburg
in 1407.54 In 1411,William VI even requested compensation by King Henry IV for
one of his subjects.55 By this point, it seems, Waghen’s case was long forgotten.
48BhESI, no 747; CCR, Richard II AD 1396–1399 (Kraus Reprint, 1972) 89–90.
49BhESI, no 749; CCR, Richard II AD 1396–1399 (Kraus Reprint, 1972) 161–62.
50As becomes clear in BhESI, no 755.
51BhESI, no 758; CPR, Henry IV Vol IV AD 1408–1413 (Kraus Reprint, 1971) 30.
52See BhESI, no 759 (23 February 1400); no 760 (14 March 1400); no 762 (6 April 1400);
no 763 (21 April 1400); no 765 (24 August 1400); no 766 (6 September 1400); no 767 (8
September 1400); no 769 (11 September 1400); no 772 (6 May 1401); no 779 (8 July 1402).
53BhESI, no 782 (1401–03); no 783 (1401–03); no 842 (1406–07); no 867 (1408–09).
These entries contain selections from Customs accounts. See also Kerling (n 17).
54BhESI, nos 846, 851, 864. See also Kerling (n 17) 143–44.
55BhESI, no 881.
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Why did this case, which originally generated so much diplomatic activity,
vanish from the English agenda for over a decade? One possibility is that the
new English king was preoccupied with other, more pressing matters, including
English rebellions, a war with the Scots and threats from the king of France in
Gascony and Calais.56 As these conﬂicts disrupted trade between England and
those countries, England could not afford to lose the much-needed trade with
Holland-Zeeland.57 For the English king, such large-scale concerns took pre-
cedence over a case of redress for an individual merchant.
Waghen’s case ﬁnally reappeared on 7 May 1412. The document even
acknowledges the long suspension: King Henry IV wrote to Count William VI
that his previous arrests proved to be of very little help for Waghen. In line with
previous policies, he explained that the Dutch count’s disregard for Waghen’s
appeals demanded the issuance of a new order for the arrest of all the goods
belonging to the count’s subjects.58 This time, the king’s order provoked a
response from the Dutch count, who, on 30 October, explained that many of his
subjects had suffered at the hands of Englishmen and that he must thus demand
restitution for his aggrieved subjects. William VI also conﬁrmed to have received
Henry IV’s letter announcing the latter’s suspension of arrests until the count could
provide more information on the case and, for that reason, provided his own
version of events. Curiously, William’s account differs from Waghen’s description
of the incident from 1396. According to the count, Waghen was to receive 852
nobles from Florenszoon from Leiden and, in order to collect his money, had
given his bond to Jacobszoon. Jacobszoon then sold the bond to Florenszoon,
but kept the money for himself. Thus, the count did not regard Florenszoon as
an offender. William VI claimed that he would order his ofﬁcials to assist
Waghen in every possible way – including by taking Jacobszoon’s goods and
giving them to Waghen. The count closed by expressing his wish that the
English, ‘who could trade nowhere more freely than in his realm’, had reacted
less harshly, as many of his subjects had suffered damage as a result.59
What were the king’s motives for readdressing Waghen’s case in 1412, apart
from the overall alleviation of turbulence in the king’s domestic and foreign
affairs?60 Although speculative, it is possible that Waghen’s position as chamber-
lain of York as well as his membership in the Corpus Christi Guild of York, which
had many inﬂuential members,61 from 1409 onwards accelerated the case’s
56E.g. Edward Powell, ‘Lancastrian England’ in Christopher Allmand (ed), The New Cam-
bridge Medieval History VII (Cambridge University Press, 1998) 457–76; BhESI, 504 n 1,
505 n 2.
57See Kerling (n 17) 134.
58BhESI, no 891; CPR,Henry IV Vol I AD 1399–1401 (His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of
State for the Home Department, 1908) 397–98.
59BhESI, no 897; see Scott and van Severen (n 8) 332–34.
60See Powell (n 56) 458–60.
61See Crouch (n 42) 170–84.
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reopening. Waghen was, in any event, building a career and expanding his inﬂu-
ence over wider networks.
Despite William’s promise, Anglo–Dutch trade suffered in the wake of con-
ﬂicts between merchants, some of which arose from Waghen’s right to carry out
reprisal. As a result of these troubles, William wrote to King Henry V (r 1413–
22) on 1 May 1413, announcing that complaints by his subjects compelled him
to send his secretary, Dirc Potter,62 to the English court. He requested that
Henry give ear to his envoy and provide redress for English transgressions.63
This marked the beginning of a series of negotiations between the royal and
comital courts aimed at resolving conﬂicts between their merchants.64
Sources do not reveal how negotiations proceeded or what exactly they
achieved. However, an announcement by the count’s council in March 1414
suggests that the negotiations succeeded in bringing about a resolution. In addition
to two other cases involving the arrest of Dutch offenders, the announcement
includes an interesting statement concerning Waghen’s case. According to the
council, the city government of Leiden had declared that any further legal
measures against their burgher Florenszoon would infringe on the city’s privi-
leges.65 This suggests that the count, who had previously vouched for Florens-
zoon’s innocence, indeed took measures against him. Negotiations with
England may have changed his opinion on the matter. In the same statement,
the council explained that, while unable to take measures against Florenszoon,
Jacobszoon was imprisoned at the expense of Holland’s treasurer and would
remain so until he could repay what was owed to Waghen.66 Although speculative,
Jacobszoon and Florenszoon may have conspired in cheating and robbing
Waghen.
Meanwhile, Waghen was in apparent need of money, possibly due to the
robbery. On 4 March 1414, Waghen was paid a sum of 22s for his ﬁnances
were still exhausted despite his long campaign for compensation.67 This not
only demonstrates that Waghen was still active in seeking justice, it also shows
some willingness to help on the part of Dutch ofﬁcials.
Although Jacobszoon was arrested, the case was not resolved. Waghen was
apparently displeased by the count’s inability to bring Florenszoon to trial.
After all, he had not yet received redress and was still in dire need of money.
On 14 May 1414, King Henry V ordered, at the request of Waghen, his admirals
and ofﬁcials to seize ships and goods coming from Leiden. After that, they should
turn over the seized goods to Waghen or his attorneys, until the outstanding 852½
62Dirc Potter is better known as a literary author, see Frits van Oostrom, Het woord van eer.
Literatuur aan het Hollandse hof omstreeks 1400 (Meulenhoff, 1988) 225–68, 262.
63BhESI, no 906.
64BhESI, p 569, n 1.
65BhESI, no 920.
66BhESI, no 920.
67BhESI, no 924.
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nobles and 22d, as well as additional expenses, were fully compensated. As usual,
the king demanded periodic updates on these arrests.68 Although this arrest order
was directed speciﬁcally at ships and goods from Leiden – possibly in an effort to
disrupt trade as little as possible – it proved necessary to adjust the scope of the
order as it began to infringe on other interests. On 24 July, King Henry V
demanded the mayor of Calais to ensure that the letters of reprisal issued on
Waghen’s account would not be used to seize foodstuff or other merchandise
brought to the market of Calais by Count William or his subjects.69 Soon after,
on 8 August, Henry prohibited his admirals and ofﬁcials from arresting any mer-
chants of Leiden that sailed to or departed from the staple of Calais, be they on
land or in open waters.70 Trade between Calais and Leiden was apparently
valued too greatly to be disrupted for Waghen’s beneﬁt.
The arrest order by Henry V proved ineffective in addressing Waghen’s loss.
Later that year, on 5 December, the king again mandated his admirals and other
servants to seize all ships from Leiden until Waghen had been fully compen-
sated.71 Soon after, however, it was again apparent that merchants from Leiden
were too important for London, and on 2 January 1415 Henry V ordered the
release of all ships and sailors seized in London. Merchants from Leiden, he
added, come and depart London freely. Despite this, Waghen’s letters of reprisal
remained in effect.72
At last, on 6 March 1415, Count William was willing to initiate a decisive res-
olution of the conﬂict and provided Waghen with a safe conduct in order to obtain
justice and compensation from Florenszoon and Jacobszoon. In an effort to expe-
dite Waghen’s efforts, the count ordered all of his judges to resolve Waghen’s case
without further delays.73 The case was ﬁnally settled later that month. We know
this thanks to an item in an account of the council of Holland that records that
Waghen, ‘who was responsible for a great amount of seizures and arrests on
68BhESI, no 921; CPR, Henry V Vol I AD 1413–1416 (Kraus Reprint, 1971) 189.
69BhESI, no 922; CCR, Henry V Vol I AD 1413–1419 (His Majesty’s Stationery Ofﬁce,
1929) 137. The texts from the BhESI and the CCR contradict each other on the point of
whether or not only victuals were to be excluded from the arrest. Comparison with the tran-
scription of the original Latin texts shows that the CCR is correct: see van Mieris (n 8) 291.
70BhESI, no 923; CCR, Henry V Vol I AD 1413–1419 (His Majesty’s Stationery Ofﬁce,
1929) 140.
71BhESI, 926; CPR, Henry V Vol I AD 1413–1416 (Kraus Reprint, 1971) 269. The CPR
refers to another order of arrest that was speciﬁcally directed at merchants from Leiden.
It is unclear whether this is again the case or not. The BhESI just states that this order is
directed at all ships and sailors coming from Holland. However, the CCR, Henry V Vol I
AD 1413–1419 (His Majesty’s Stationery Ofﬁce, 1929) on p 165 refers to letters of
marque that are granted against the town of Leiden. Therefore, we suspect that the
ordered arrest on 5 December was indeed only directed at the citizens of Leiden.
72BhESI, no 927; CCR, Henry V Vol I AD 1413–1419 (His Majesty’s Stationery Ofﬁce,
1929) 165. The BhESI omits the fact the letters of marque of Waghen were only directed
at the citizens of Leiden.
73BhESI p 574, n 2.
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subjects of the Dutch count as he failed to obtain money from Jacobszoon and
Florenszoon’, was compensated by the burggraaf (≈ viscount) of Leiden and
the treasurer of Holland, who had assumed Waghen’s claim against Jacobszoon
and Florenszoon. In turn, Waghen pledged with a sealed letter that he considered
the case resolved and, given his compensation, would no longer harass the count’s
subjects.74
The resolution of this case is very interesting. In taking over Waghen’s demand
for payment by Jacobszoon and Florenszoon, the burggraaf and the treasurer
reduced the case from an international to a local affair within Holland. This con-
forms to a normative model in which the ‘victim’ of reprisal could seek damage
redress by ﬁling a claim against the original wrongdoer within his own country,
region or jurisdiction.75 How often this occurred in practice is a matter for discus-
sion.76 That question notwithstanding, the burggraaf’s and treasurer’s willingness
to assume responsibility for Waghen’s claim is striking as it reveals the power of
authorities in resolving private conﬂicts involving their subjects. By compensating
Waghen, the Dutch count protected his subjects while restoring a mutually-
beneﬁcial ﬂow of commerce.
IV. Conclusion
There were no straightforward means by which individuals involved in Anglo–
Dutch trade could obtain redress for damages incurred during conﬂicts. In all
cases, reprisal remained a last resort, a point that conﬁrms the legal doctrine
described by Bartolus. Before letters of reprisal were actually issued, complaints
prompted ofﬁcials to investigate the charges and drove victims and rulers to
issue multiple requests for restitution. The ﬁrst allusions to reprisal served as a
warning and a means of pressuring opposing rulers to take action. When the
right to carry out reprisal was ﬁnally granted, either via arrests or by private
action, precision remained a principal concern. This explains why princes con-
trolled the repayment of individuals even when the latter carried out the seizures
without the assistance of civic authorities.
While this underscores the great effort invested in ensuring a peaceful settle-
ment of a conﬂict, the case of John Waghen illustrates the difﬁculties in bringing
about such resolutions in practice. Victims like Waghen needed patience and per-
severance in their efforts to garner support of the respective rulers. Waghen’s
redress of damage was initially postponed by an unwilling Dutch count, and
74BhESI, no 930. The exact date of the resolution is unknown. However, the other items
suggest that it happened quite soon after 6 March. At least this statement was made no
later than 28 July 1415. The reason we ﬁnd Waghen’s case in the account is because a hos-
teller (waard) was paid by the count who had acted on Waghen’s behalf in the case.
75See Lokin and Zwalve (n 3) 113–14.
76See also the article of Javier Añibarro Ródríguez on Cuatro villas in northern Castile in
this issue.
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even when letters of reprisal were granted by the English king, broader economic
concerns overrode and delayed pursuance of Waghen’s case. The king prioritised
other, more pressing matters, such as the continuation of trade and imports of food-
stuff to the city of London, thus deferring what was hoped to be a quick resolution
of the case. Dutch imports of foodstuff outweighed the damage redress of a single
merchant. In addition to the inactivity and restrictiveness of rulers, the jurisdic-
tional privileges enjoyed by the alleged offender’s hometown, and the near immu-
nity these afforded him, proved to be further obstacle for redress. In the end,
Waghen’s perseverance proved to be worthwhile. The numerous arrests of
Dutch merchants and goods that his case initiated in England eventually com-
pelled a resolution of Waghen’s case, one which the Dutch count and burggraaf
of Leiden successfully administered on Waghen’s behalf. As in England, concerns
about the state of foreign trade were prioritised in the Low Countries. With broader
Dutch trade interests in England at stake, ofﬁcials recognised that the wider
beneﬁts of commerce outweighed the singular costs of damage redress for
Waghen.
Anglo–Dutch practices for reprisal in the fourteenth century were far more than
ultimate or desperate remedies for damage redress. They served as a means of per-
suasion for both the king of England and the count of Holland and could be
employed in support of their respective citizens and their ventures on either side
of the North Sea. Both rulers acknowledged the complaints of merchants and skip-
pers under the authority of the other party and engaged one another diplomatically in
turn. This suggests a mutual awareness of their shared interest in Anglo–Dutch
trade. These diplomatic relations, which were initiated by merchants, can be
viewed as expressions of bottom-up diplomacy. As the case of Waghen illustrates,
this did not necessarily facilitate an easy or swift redress of damages for the victim.
But it does suggest that Anglo–Dutch diplomacy could serve to foster commercial
relations between the two countries.77 Although rulers prioritised the more general
interests at stake in Anglo–Dutch trade, such as the sustenance of London and other
English cities, over the interests of an individual merchant, ongoing diplomatic con-
tacts eventually enabled individuals to pursue their campaign for damage redress
with a reasonable chance of success. As is illustrated in Waghen’s case: determi-
nation was key. It is striking that Waghen, who may not have been a very important
merchant (at least not when the case was initiated), could rely on the support of his
king in seeking compensation for his loss, even as several factors limited the king’s
latitude in this respect. Waghen’s case illustrates how rulers employed diplomacy to
prevent isolated cases from spiralling into a larger economic and political crises, thus
demonstrating a clear preference for peace. Waghen’s case did little long-term
damage to the state of Anglo–Dutch relations.
77On diplomacy and commerce in medieval Atlantic Europe see Jesús Ángel Solórzano Tel-
echea, Beatriz Arízaga Bolumburu and Louis Sicking (eds), Diplomacia y comercio en la
Europa atlántica medieval (Instituto de Estudios Riojanos, 2015).
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In actively seeking damage redress, authorities on both sides, that is to say the
rulers and their supporting cast of councilmen and ofﬁcials, enhanced their control
over their citizens and over foreigners doing business within their territories. This
also allowed rulers to employ this authority in diplomatic engagements demanding
appreciation for and the judicious balance of different and at times conﬂicting
interests. Finally, it made their territories more attractive for trade, as visitors
were more easily reassured and encouraged by support extended by their
foreign hosts.
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